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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has authority to hear this appeal pursuant to Article
8 of the Constitution of the State of Utah;

§78-2(3)(1) and §78-2a-3

of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; and, Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order signed by Judge James S.
Sawaya of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
§30-3-10.6(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

4

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

DID JUDGE SAWAYA COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING

TO MAKE A FINDING IN SUPPORT OF HIS DECISION TO DENY
APPELLANT AN AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT FOR THE PERIOD OF
TIME HER PETITION FOR MODIFICATION HAD BEENPENDING?

II.

DID THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT

TRIAL SUPPORT THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT TO DENY
APPELLANT RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE INCREASE IN
CHILD SUPPORT HE HAD JUST AWARDED?

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were divorced in February, 1980.

The findings of

fact and conclusions of law published with the divorce decree state
that at the time of the entry of the decree, the income of the
respondent, a medial doctor, was in the amount of $77,03 0.54 per year.
Based on a stipulation of the parties, entered into at the time of the
divorce, the child support obligation of the respondent was set at
$300.00 per child, per month.

The respondent's alimony obligation to

the appellant was further established at the amount of $900.00 per
month.
Three

years

later,

appellant,

believing

that

her

former

husband's income had increased dramatically and her needs for support
having also increased, filed a petition for modification of the decree.
She asked for an increase in the child support and alimony awards.
In the process of litigating that petition for modification,
Carol Brown, the appellant, was asked to agree to a settlement proposal
and did.

She later felt she should be relieved of that agreement.

Judge Sawaya below determined that the appellant had entered into a
binding agreement dispositive of her petition for modification.

This

lower court entered an order enforcing the terms of the settlement
agreement, which was a final order terminating Carol's petition to
modify.
Carol Brown appealed. Her appeal was assigned to this honorable
court as Case Number 860125-CA.

In a decision dated December 18th,

1987 and issued October 21, 1987, this court reversed the decision of
Judge Sawaya stating that it was unfair to hold Carol to the terms of
6

the settlement agreement under the circumstances and remanded the case
back for further proceedings (see Adendum B ) .
Because of the delay on appeal, there were new and changed facts
to be discovered.

After additional discovery, the matter was tried on

October 18th, 1988 before Judge Sawaya of the Third District Court.
After taking the matter under advisement, the lower court issued
its memorandum decision. Without making a finding in support thereof,
Judge Sawaya declined to grant the appellant any increase in child
support

on

a

retroactive

basis,

even

though

her

petition

for

modification had been on file since March 1, 1983 (a period of more
than five years).

A sum in excess of $33,000.00 was at stake, and

there was statutory authority for such a retroactive award. It is from
this decision of the Third District Court that Carol Brown brings this,
her second appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ISSUE ONE
The appellant maintains that the court below committed reversible
error when it failed to make any finding whatsoever concerning her
request for a retroactive increase in her child support award. The
undisputed testimony presented at trial was to the effect that Dr.
Brown had much more income when the petition was filed than he had at
the time of the divorce.

The undisputed testimony was specifically

that Dr. Brown's income had gone from $70,000 at the time of the
7

decree, a year to over $150,000 each year for virtually all of the five
years it took for Carol to get her petition heard (1983-1988).

By the

time of trial, the issue of whether of not Carol should have been
granted child support increases retroactively to the day the petition
was filed was at least a $33,000 issue. For the court to simply fail
to make any finding on such a substantial issue is error of law.

ISSUE TWO
The evidence presented at that trial effecting the issue was
circumstantial. It was that the respondent had the ability to make the
increased child support payments all through the petition process (five
and one half years with intervening appeal) .

The evidence was also

that Carol Brown had needed the increases all through that period.
There was statutory authority for a retroactive award §30-3-10.6(2).
It seems obvious from the final outcome that, but for the necessity of
her interim appeal, Carol would have had the increases she ultimately
won at an earlier date (what she got was an increase in total child
support from $900.00 per month to $1,500.00 per month.

For the court

to refuse to give any retroactive application to the increases he
awarded the appellant at trial, when it took her five and one half
years to win it, is not equity and punishes her for her interim appeal.

8

ARGUMENT

DID JUDGE SAWAYA COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING
TO MAKE A FINDING IN SUPPORT OF HIS DECISION TO DELAY THE
APPELLANT AN AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT FOR THE PERIOD OF
TIME HER PETITION FOR MODIFICATION HAD BEEN PENDING?

Carol Brown asserts that the failure of the lower court to make
a finding on this issue is reversible error. The parties were divorced
in February, 1980. Carol Brown filed a petition for modification three
years later, in 1983.
1988.

Her petition was not tried until October of

Part of the reason it took five and one half years to get to

trial was because Carol had to file an interim appeal.

Judge Sawaya

had previously terminated her petition, by enforcing a settlement
agreement on her.

Carol appealed.

This court reversed, and remanded

for trial.
Carol Brown presented evidence at the time of trial in October
of 1988 showing what had happened to her income, and what had happened
to her former husband's income since the divorce. Although there were
some questions concerning whether or not Dr. Brown should be allowed
to deduct losses on investments from his income for child support
purposes, the income figures were largely undisputed.
A finding made at the time of the decree of divorce was that
Dr. Brown then had income of $70,000 plus in 1980. The appellant was
unemployed at that time and had no income.

9

In subsequent years the

parties1 income, as established at the time of trial, was as outlined
below:
APPELLANT'S INCOME

RESPONDENT'S INCOME

1982

$1,911.00

1982

$123,187.00

1983

.00

1983

160,628.36

1984

.00

1984

146,079.08

1985

1,985.00

1985

135,905.00

1986

12,996.00

1986

70,750.00

1987

14,127.46

1987

190,621.73

The child support guide lines which were in effect at the time
of trial, or about to go into effect, (Oct. 1988) suggested, based on
the incomes outlined above, that the child support obligation of Dr.
Brown be increased from $300.00 per child per month, for each of three
children, to approximately $600.00 per child per month, or an increase
in the total amount from $900.00 per month to $1,800.00 per month. In
actuality, it was a little difficult to quote Judge Sawaya an accurate
chart guide line because Dr. Brown's income was "off the charts". The
charts that were in use in October of 1988 had no suggested figures for
incomes greater than $10,000.00 per month gross.
Judge Sawaya granted Carol an increase from $300.00 per child
per month to $500.00 per child per month for a total of $1,500.00 per
month.
With the exception of 1986, Dr. Brown's income had been "off the
charts" during the entire time period the petition had been pending.
It is reasonable for appellant to assume that she would have been
10

awarded the increase she got in October of 1988 at a trial on the
issues held any time earlier.
The difference between Dr. Brown's child support obligation in
the 1980 decree of $900.00 per month, and the $1,500.00 per month
appellant won at trial in October 1988 is $600.00 a month.
petition for modification was filed in February of 1983.

The

By the time

Judge Sawaya denied Carol Brown's request for a retroactive award of
child support, her petition had been pending for fifty six months.
Fifty six months times six hundred dollars per month equals $33,600.00.
Carol Brown didn't know how much of an increase the court would
award her, but it was expected it would be substantial because her
former husband's income had doubled, while hers stayed relatively low.
It was anticipated that the request for a retroactive award would give
rise to a substantial issue.
Rule 52B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "In
all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially . . ." Rule 52 further
makes it clear that "requests for findings are not necessary for
purposes of review."

Judge Sawaya made no finding on this important

issue (see Adendum A ) .
In 1977, the Utah Legislature enacted §30-3-10.6 U. C. A.
became effective January 19, 1988.

It

It states:

"A child or spousal support payment under a child support
order may be modified with respect to any period during
which a petition for modification is pending, but only
from the date notice of that petition was given ..."
This statutory provision allowing a retroactive award is designed to
11

allow the trial court to get at fairness, and to eliminate, as much as
possible,

the

litigation.

unfair

effects

of

delay

in

divorce

modification

The premise is that if a change is warranted under a

petition for modification, that change should be effective as of the
date both sides were aware of the change in the fact situation that
warranted it. To make one party or the other live with an order, which
that party later demonstrates needed to be changed earlier, without
relief, encourages the party responding to the litigation to delay and
punishes the petitioner unnecessarily.
Generally speaking, appellant asserts that it should be, and
is, the policy of the court to give retroactive relief. Judge Sawaya,
however, refused to do so.

Appellant asks herself, "why?"

answer that can be given is, "We do not know."

The only

"The Judge made no

finding which would explain."
Judge Sawaya did find that:
"The changes of circumstances are twofold, in that
the plaintiff is now employed, earning approximately
$14,000.00 per year annually, whereas at the time t h e
decree was entered, she was unemployed, having no income.
As a further change of circumstances, the court finds
that the defendant personally has income potential
exceeding $100,000.00 annually, whereas his income
potential at the time of the decree was approximately
$70,000.00 per year."

[MEMORANDUM

DECISION

ADDENDUM

A]
If there was some reason the court felt Carol Brown was not
deserving of a retroactive award, we can't tell what it was.

If the

lower court felt that it would be unfairly burdensome to Dr. Brown to
pay a retroactive child support increase, we don't know why.

We can

only speculate as to why Judge Sawaya made the order he did.

It is

12

clear that Judge Sawaya was obligated to make a finding on substantial
issues, that this issue involving $3 3,600.00 was substantial, and that
Judge Sawaya made no finding concerning it.
The judgment below should at least be reversed as to the
decision to deny retroactive relief on the child support issue for the
entry of findings by Judge Sawaya and reconsideration in light of this
courts opinion.

Appellant requests that this court reverse and award

judgment against respondent for $33,600.00 plus interest at 12% since
the date of trial.

ISSUE TWO

DID THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
TRIAL SUPPORT THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT TO DENY
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT
HE HAD JUST AWARDED ?

Carol Brown asserts thcit the preponderance of the evidence
presented at trial did not support Judge Sawaya1s decision.
Utah case law makes it clear that the appellant bears the burden
of showing this court, based on the record, that the evidence does not
support the judgement,if it is her claim that it does not.
A brief review of the trial transcript becomes unavoidable.
Charyce Brown was the first witness. She is the daughter of the
parties. She was twelve when the petition was filed, but was eighteen
and in college at B.Y.U. by the time of trial. She testified briefly
13

about which parent she planed to live with when not is school, and
whether or not she wanted the child support paid for her by her father
paid directly to her or through her mother [t2-8].

She testified that

she considered her mother's house her permanent address, but that she
wanted to feel free to live with either parent. She also said she
didn't care how child support was paid, directly to her or through her
mother.
The next witness called was the appellant Carol Brown.

She

testified that she had married Dr. Brown when she was twenty two, had
worked a year and a half when first married.

She said that she had

been a homemaker during the rest of their ten and one half year
marriage [tl2].

She said that her husband had worked at J.C.Penneys

one year, but otherwise was in school most of the time they were
married. The parties got divorced while Dr. Brown was in his first year
of practice as an obstetrician/gynecologist [tl3]. It was in his first
year of private practice that Dr. Brown earned the $70,000.00 plus that
the court found to be his income at the time of the divorce [tl4].
Carol further said that the parties had three children born
during the marriage who were ages three, six, and nine at the time of
the divorce [tl5].

She stated that at the time of the decree she

received child support and alimony which totaled $1,800.00 a month and
that she had no other income. Carol further testified that she had not
remarried since the divorce or cohabitated with any adult male.

She

also stated that Dr. Brown had married shortly after their divorce
[tl8].

She said that she had no other income than child support and

alimony in 1980, and 1981.

She also testified that she had income of
14

her own in 1982 beyond child support and alimony in the amount of
$1,018.08 [tl9].

Carol stated that she couldn't remember if she had

income in 1983 beyond alimony and child support. She had tried selling
real estate that year but had been unsuccessful.

She also said that

in 1984 she had tried selling Herbalife, but that she had only earned
a couple hundred of dollars in all of 1984.

Carol said she had

$1,929.00 income in 1985 [t20].
Carol testified that she had a college degree, but that the
amount of retraining necessary to obtain a teaching certificate was
prohibitive in terms of time and expense.

She also said that after

extensive interviewing, she decided to take a job at Eastern Airlines
and worked there all through 1986.

Carol earned $12,996.88 in 1986.

Carol also worked for Eastern Airlines in 1987 and had an income of
$14,720.00 [t24].
Carol then testified concerning her expenses as itemized on a
financial declaration which was dated October 10, 1988 which showed
her gross monthly income, at the time of trial, at $1,077.29. She also
was then receiving child support and alimony totaling $1,800.00. Her
further testimony was that including alimony and child support, but
with taxes taken out of her personal income, she had net pay of
$2,692.00 per month [t27].

Carol testified concerning her various

monthly expenses including maintenance on her home, which she described
as being in a state of considerable disrepair.

She described large

windows in her house being cracked, carpet being more than eighteen
years old, a broken toilet, among other things [t35].
that she wanted to save some money to buy a new car.
15

She testified
She was driving

a 1980 Buick with 108,000 miles on it. Carol's testimony was that her
total expenses a month were $1,100.00 in excess of her net income
including alimony and child support [t39].

Carol testified that she

owned no motor vehicles other than her car; no camper, trailer, boat,
motorcycle, snowmobile, airplane, or any interest in any real estate
other than her house.

She also stated that she would have filed her

petition for modification earlier than 1983, but believed that a
provision in her decree which barred any petition to modify for three
years would not allow it. Carol further stated that she had no stocks,
bonds, certificates of deposit, retirement benefits, IRAs or Keoghs
[t38].
Carol also testified that because she was employed by Eastern
Airlines she had the opportunity to fly at highly discounted rates.
For example she stated that she could fly anywhere in the United States
for $6.00 one way.

She also stated that she could fly outside the

United States anywhere Eastern flew for $22.00 one way.

She also said

that tremendous discounts on lodging were available to her through her
connections in the travel industry as an airline employee.

She said

that she had taken as much advantage of that opportunity for travel as
she could.

She further testified that she had worked holidays and

weekends to make up days she missed while traveling [t44-46].
Carol Brown's tax returns for the years in question were
offered

as

evidence, and

admitted.

Calculations

based

on the

Governor's Task Force on Child Support worksheet and schedules showing
what an appropriate amount of child support would be, based on the
incomes of the parties was offered, and admitted by the court, as
16

advisory and illustrative of the appellant's theory of the case [t51].
Mr. Dart cross examined both Charyce Brown and Carol Brown at
the conclusion of their testimony under direct examination. The cross
examination generated more heat than light.
The next witness who testified was Christi Farnsworth, a
vocational specialist.

She testified that anybody with a bachelor's

degree, even if age 41 and out of the work force fifteen years, could
get a full time job paying $20,000.00 within ninety days.

She also

testified that she had never met, spoken to, or interviewed Carol
Brown, and knew nothing about her [t95-97].
Dr. Brown was next called to the stand.

Dr. Brown was shown

his individual tax returns for 1980 through and including 1987. With
regard to each tax return, Dr. Brown stated that the return he was
shown in court was a true and accurate copy of an original that he had
filed with the IRS for the year indicated, and that he had signed the
original.

For those years during which Dr. Brown was remarried, he

also identified the fact that his new wife's income was included in the
return, and that she had also signed the original return. The exhibits
representing Dr. Brown's tax returns for 1980 through 1987 were all
admitted in evidence. Dr. Brown testified, while having the tax return
exhibits in his hands, that his personal income (not including his new
wife's) had been as follows:
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1980

$81,500.00

1981

87,744.27

1982

98,550.00

1983

144,600.00

1984

132,799.16

1985

123,550.00

1986

70,750.00

1987

165,500.00

Dr. Brown testified that with regard to each of the years 1980
through 1987 he had also put monies in his corporate pension and profit
sharing plan, which monies were not included in the income figures in
his tax returns. The only exception to this was 1986, a year in which
he had made no contribution to his pension and profit sharing plan.
Dr. Brown was then shown plaintiff's exhibit 15, which he identified
as a summary of contributions he had made to his pension and profit
sharing plan each year for the years 1980 through 1987.

Dr. Brown

indicated that the exhibit was a true and accurate summary of the
contributions he had made to his pension and profit sharing plan for
those years. Dr. Brown stated that only a portion of the money placed
in his pension and profit sharing plan each year was attributable to.
This

is because

there were other employees

of his professional

corporation who also participated in his pension and profit sharing
plan.

Dr. Brown testified that the following amounts contributed each

year to the plan were directly attributable to him for his benefit and
not his employees:
18

1980

$15,260.00

1981

21,936.06

1982

24,637.50

1983

16,028.36

1984

13,279.92

1985

12,335.00

1986

no contribution

1987

25,120.73

In addition to the income listed on his tax returns, and the
monies put aside in his pension and profit sharing plan listed above,
Dr. Brown stated that his new wife, Franc Brown, earned an average of
approximately $2 0,000.00 a year.
Dr. Brown was next shown plaintiff's exhibit 22, which he
identified as a record of his new families1 expenditures, which he had
personally produced on a home computer.

Dr. Brown testified that

exhibit was a true and accurate listing of all his expenditures for
1987, and that he had expended in his household in 1987 a total of
$164,223.83.

Dr. Brown testified that he owned a twenty six foot 1988

sea ray boat, had traveled abroad and in the United States with his
family on vacations since the divorce [tll9].

He said that he lived

in a house which he had paid $168,000.00 for, and had done $15,000.00
worth of improvements to it.

Since his divorce Dr. Brown had been a

partner in a business known as Trekker Aeronautics, which had owned a
Beachcraft Bonanza airplane. His partner in the airplane business had
been his second wife, Frankie.

He had taken training in the plane to

become a pilot, but later sold the plane and dissolved Trekker
19

Aeronautics [tl24].

Mr. Dart cross examined Dr. Brown and pointed out

that it had been eight years since the divorce, and that Dr., Brown had
paid his alimony of $900.00 a month faithfully for those eight years.
Dr. Brown was asked whether he believed he had paid alimony long
enough, and he indicated that he believed that he did.

Dr. Brown also

testified that he believed he should be allowed to pay his older
child's, Charyce, child support directly to her and not through his
former wife. The remaining portion of Dr. Brown's redirect and recross
examination concerned Dr. Brown's request for extended visitation with
his children.
Dr. Brown then testified that he had been paid as personal
income $144,000.00 in the first ten and one half months of 1988 up
until the time of trial.

He also said that he anticipated that his

income for that year would be $160,000.00. He also stated that he had
made a total contribution for himself and his employees in the pension
and profit sharing plan for 1988 in the amount of $30,000.00 [tl44].
Dr. Brown stated that he was willing to have the court increase his
child support obligation from $300.00 per child per month to $500.00
per child per month.
This just happened to be exactly the same amount of money in
child support as was contained in the stipulation which Judge Sawaya
had earlier ruled Carol Brown was stuck with.

It was Judge Sawaya's

decision to enforce that stipulation on Carol, which resulted in her
prior appeal in this case to this court and reversal of Judge Sawaya's
order.

It seems to the appellant to be more than coincidental that

Judge Sawaya, was reversed, then later at trial, when evidence was
20

presented that the child support should be $1,600.00 to $1,700.00 per
month based on the charts, that Judge Sawaya then, when Dr. Brown's
income was "off the charts", awarded after trial only $1,500.00 a month
for child support.

This is exactly the same amount she would have

gotten under the terms of the stipulation he enforced against her, but
was reversed on.

Not a single piece of evidence presented at trial

suggested that $1,500.00 was an appropriate amount to increase child
support to.
Appellant believes that Judge Sawaya intends to teach her
a lesson, the lesson being that it will not benefit her to appeal his
decisions.

She feels that Judge Sawaya has punished her for appealing

his order and getting him reversed.
Carol Brown, however, does not appeal the amount of the child
support award.

In the instant case, Judge Sawaya refused, without

findings, to give Carol Brown any retroactive affect to her newly won
increases in child support. In the five and one half years it took her
to get from petition through an appeal and complete a trial, her
children had gone from ages six, nine, and twelve to ages eleven,
fourteen, and eighteen.

She and her children had gone without the

benefits of an increase in child support for five and one half years.
The evidence presented at the time of trial clearly demonstrated that
both the appellant, and her children, had been entitled to at least the
increase they were eventually awarded from the day they filed their
petition.

The only reason Carol Brown did not obtain the increases

sooner was that she could not get to trial sooner.

It was not her

fault that she had to appeal Judge Sawaya's interim decision and get
21

him reversed to get back on track to trial (a process which consumed
nearly two and one half years).

Dr. Brown's financial position was

substantial and extensive discovery had to be done, both pre and post
appeal because of the changes which had occurred during the interim
period. It was obvious from the evidence that she and the children had
needed the money during the entire five and one half years so as to
allow the children to live a life style somewhat like their father's
new family enjoyed.

It is clear from Carol's testimony that the

appellant and her children did not have that kind of money and did not
have that kind of life style.
It may be argued by the respondent, that to grant appellant
retroactive increases is to grant the appellant a windfall. Appellant,
however, points out that to fail to grant her retroactive application
of her increase in child support is to allow the respondent, Dr. Brown,
a windfall. The difference is, that Carol Brown still has children at
home.

She has a daughter in college whom she cannot afford to assist

financially.

She spent five and one half years struggling with her

children, through comparatively hard financial times. During that five
and one half years her former husband could offer the children the sun,
moon, and stars financially, and did.

She, on the other hand, was the

comparatively poor custodial parent who couldn't compete with her
husband's ability to buy the children's attention and affection. Giving
her the money now will help the children at home and Charyce in
college, and Dr. Brown can afford to pay it.

22

CONCLUSION

The court below committed reversible error when it failed to
make any finding whatsoever concerning Carol Brown's request that the
increase in child support prayed for in her petition for modification
be made retroactive to the date of filing. Based on the court's final
award,

increasing

the

respondent's

child

support

obligation

to

$1,500.00 per month, and considering the fifty six month period it took
to litigate the matter, the retroactive award issue was a $33,600.00
issue.

Such substantial issues must be supported by findings.

The

decision of the lower court to deny appellant any retroactive award for
child support should be reversed.

The appellant should be awarded

judgment against the respondant for $33,600.00 plus interest at the
rate of 12% per anum on said amount from the date of trial, plus costs
of court.
The preponderance of the credible evidence, and in fact, the
uncontroverted evidence presented at trial, was to the effect that
Dr. Brown's income had roughly doubled, typically exceeding $100,000.00
per year, and that this had been true since 1982. Carol Brown, on the
other hand, had no income at the time of the divorce and has not earned
more than $15,000.00 in a year since.

All the evidence concerning

expenses of the parties showed that they had lived a life style
consistent with their income.

Using the income figures of the parties

to calculate a child support obligation for Dr. Brown indicated that
a substantial increase in child support was warranted, and had been
warranted since 1982. Not a shred of evidence was produced at the time
23

of trial in support of any claim by Dr. Brown that a retroactive child
support award should not be made other than the claim that such an
award would be a windfall to the appellant.
The

decision

of

the

court below

to

deny

Carol

Brown a

retroactive application of the child support increase awarded her
should be reversed as not supported by the weight of the evidence, and
this court should enter judgment in favor of Carol Brown for $33,600.00
plus interest from the date of the lower court's decision at the
judgment rate until paid, plus costs..

Respectfully submitted,

David A. McPhie
Counsel for the Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four true and correct
copies of the foregoing appellant's brief to attorney for respondent,
B.L. Dart, at 310 S. Main Street, #1330, Salt Lake City, Uj£ah, on this
day of June, 1989.
^\
.
"X
David A. McPhie
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. D-79-3802

Plaintiff,
vs.
BRYANT JEROME BROWN,
Defendant.

The matter of the plaintiff's Petition and the defendant's
counter

Petition

for Modification

of the Decree

of Divorce

entered in this matter came on regularly for trial before the
Court on the 18th day of October, 1988. The parties were present
with counsel.

David A. McPhie, Esq. appeared on behalf of the

plaintiff and the petitioner, Bert L. Dart, Esq. appeared on
behalf of the defendant and counter-petitioner.

The matters of

the Petition and counter Petition were fully presented, argued
and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon taken under
advisement.

The Court having now fully considered the pleadings,

exhibits, authorities and Memoranda of the parties, now makes its
ruling and decision thereon as follows.
The Court finds that there has been a material change of
circumstances since entry of the original Decree of Divorce in
this matter.

That the changes of circumstances are two-fold in

BROWN V. BROWN

that

the

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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plaintiff

is

now

employed,

earning

approximately

$14,000.00 annually, whereas at the time the Decree was entered
she was unemployed, having no income.
circumstances

the

income potential

Court

As a further change of

finds that defendant personally

exceeding

$100,000.00

has

annually, whereas his

income and potential at the time of the Decree was approximately
$70,000.00 per year.
Based

upon

the

foregoing

finding

of

a

change

in

circumstances, the Court will enter the following Order:
1.

That alimony previously ordered in the sum of $900.00

per month continue at that rate, and that it terminate at the
time that the youngest child of the parties attains the age of
majority.
2.

That child support be increased from the sum of $300.00

per month, per child to the sum of $500.00 per month, per child.
Child support for the oldest child, Charisse, shall be paid
directly to her, since she has attained the age of majority.
That child support for any child attaining the age of majority be
paid directly to that child pursuant to the provisions of the
original Decree providing for continued child support to any
child of the parties to age 21 if that child elects to serve a
mission for the L.D.S. Church, or shall elect to attend a college
or university.
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3.

Plaintiffs

Petition

for

MEMORANDUM DECISION

increased

child

support

retroactive to the date of filing her Petition is denied.
4.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees in

the sum of $5,000.00, which sum the Court determines to be
reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this proceeding,
together with her costs reasonably incurred in processing and
proceeding with her Petition.
5.

Defendant's

counter

Petition

seeking

increased

visitation is granted to allow defendant a period of six weeks
during the summer months for visitation with the minor children.
Only, however, based upon the same terms and conditions as in the
original Decree provided.

The Court has reviewed the visitation

provision of the original Decree, and finds it in all other
respects to be fair and reasonable, and no modification other
than indicated will be made.
Plaintiff's counsel is requested to prepare and submit the
appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of
modification as above-indicated.
Dated this

27th

day of October, 1988.

JAMES S. 'SAW&YA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum

Decision,

postage

day of October, 1988:

David A. McPhie
Attorney for Plaintiff
3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
B. L. Dart
Attorney for Defendant
310 S. Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

prepaid,

to

the
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Carol Ann Barker Brown,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Bryant Jerome Brown,

Case No. 860125-CA

Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Orme.

FILED
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DAVIDSON, Judge:

Timothy M. Shea
ClerK of the Court
Utah Ccjrt of Appeals

Plaintiff appeals from an order relative to the
modification of a decree of divorce which treated a putative
stipulation as dispositive of all issues. We reverse and remand,
The parties were married on June 4, 1969. Three children
were born to the Browns; all of whom are still minors at the
time of this appeal. Defendant is a physician with a practice
located in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff possesses a bachelor's
degree and was not employed at the time of divorce. The amended
decree of divorce was signed on February 21, 1980. The salient
provisions were: plaintiff would have custody of the children
subject to specified visitation rights; defendant would pay
child support in the amount of $300.00 per child per month for a
total of $900.00 per month; defendant would pay $900.00 per
month as alimony which would cease if plaintiff remarried or
cohabited with a male; and plaintiff would not be able to seek
an increase in support or alimony for 36 months after the date
of the decree.
On March 1, 1983, plaintiff filed a petition for
modification of the decree of divorce which was based on a
significant increase in defendant's gross income and a material
change in plaintiff's circumstances. The two most important
requests for modification were for increases in alimony and
child support to $1,500.00 per month and $500.00 per child per
month, respectively. Defendant counterpetitioned for
termination of alimony and for expanded visitation rights.

During the next fifteen months discovery and settlement
negotiations took place. Plaintiff's deposition was scheduled
for June 5# 1984, in preparation for a trial set for August 14,
1984, Apparently plaintiff's counsel caused opposing counsel to
believe that the issues had been resolved satisfactorily and that
the time scheduled for the taking of plaintiff's deposition could
be used to record the agreement. The parties and their
respective counsel met on the scheduled date and recorded the
agreement at issue before a certified shorthand reporter. In
addition to visitation arrangements/ the agreement provided that/
commencing July 1984, alimony would be reduced from $900.00 per
month to $500.00 per month and would continue for two years at
the lower level before terminating. Child support was increased
from $300.00 per child per month to $500.00 per child per month
with conditions specified when such support would also
terminate. The record indicates that both counsel and defendant
spoke but that plaintiff said nothing during the proceedings.
The agreement was subsequently reduced to writing and sent to
plaintiff's counsel. Beginning in July 1984/ defendant began
paying the total amount set forth in the agreement/ which
payments were accepted by plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that she was not given a copy of the
written agreement until August 1984. She immediately attempted
to consult with her counsel but was unable to see him until late
in September. At that meeting/ plaintiff stated that she
believed the agreement to be unfair and refused to sign it. Her
counsel withdrew on November 1, 1984.
On February 14/ 1985/ defendant filed a motion for an order
approving and enforcing the settlement agreement. On February
25/ 1985/ plaintiff filed an affidavit which stated that her
former counsel had assured her that increases in alimony and
child support were justified and that he was confident she would
win major increases in both; that she was unaware of the tenor of
the proposed settlement agreement until the day scheduled for her
deposition; that her former counsel informed her that he told
opposing counsel that she would agree to the settlement; that she
was "shocked/ dismayed/ dissapointed [sic]/ and confused" by her
counsel's change in position; that she didn't recall speaking at
the proceeding; and that she refused to sign the written
agreement. A hearing on defendant's motion was held before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner in March 1985/ who recommended
that the motion be granted. Plaintiff rejected the
recommendation and the motion was argued in Third District Court
in April. The order enforcing the agreement was filed on May 1/
1985/ and plaintiff timely filed her notice of appeal. The issue
is whether or not the trial court should have accepted and
enforced the proceedings of June 5/ 1984/ as a stipulation
between the parties.
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It is necessary to begin by looking at what constitutes a
"stipulation".
A promise or agreement with reference to a
pending judicial proceeding, made by a party
to the proceeding or his attorney, is
binding without consideration. By statute
or rule of court such an agreement is
generally binding only (a) if it is in
writing and signed by the party or attorney,
or (b) if it is made or admitted in the
presence of the court, or (c) to the extent
that justice requires enforcement in view of
material change of position in reliance on
the promise or agreement.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94 (1981).
Further,
It has been said that unless it is clear
from the record that the parties assented,
there is no stipulation, and it is provided
in many jurisdictions, by rule of court or
by statute, that a private agreement or
consent between the parties or their
attorneys, in respect to the proceedings in
a cause, will not be enforced by the court
unless it is evidenced by a writing
subscribed by the party against whom it is
alleged or made, and filed by the clerk or
entered upon the minutes of the court. Any
other rule would require the court to pass
upon the credibility of the attorneys.
73 Am. Jur. 2d Stipulations § 2 (1974) (footnote
omitted).
Utah R. Prac. D. & C. Ct. 4.5(b) requires that H[n]o orders,
judgments or decrees upon stipulation shall be signed or entered
unless such stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk,
provided that the stipulation may be made orally in open court.M
There can be little doubt the rule of practice is concerned with
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds as expressed in Utah
Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1984)* which states that certain agreements
1. § 25-5-4: Certain agreements void unless written and
subscribed. In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the making thereof.
860125-CA
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are void unless in writing and subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith. The Statute
of Frauds was not interposed as
an affirmative defense below.2
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds of
those involved. The parties must have completed their
negotiations either in person or through their attorneys acting
within the rules of agency. The agreement then is reduced to
writing, signed and filed with the clerk or read into the record
before the court. This procedure would indicate obvious assent
to the provisions of the agreement so stipulated. Not so here.
This agreement was reached between one of the parties and
both counsel. Mrs. Brown remained silent while it was discussed
and read into the record. The proceeding was not done in court
as would be permitted by Rule 4.5(b) but was done at the time of
a deposition before a shorthand reporter. Had it been done in
court a judge would have been involved and would have made
inquiry of the parties, likely while they were both under oath,
if they understood and agreed with the terms. Had Mrs. Brown
remained silent in that scenario it is hard to imagine the court
finding agreement. The same conclusion is compelled here.
Silence cannot be construed to be assent in these circumstances.
For a stipulation to be binding, agreement by the parties must be
evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in court on the record
before a judge. The facts in this case do not show such
evidence. Therefore, there was no stipulation reached between
the parties and there is nothing for the court to enforce.
Defendant argues that plaintiff made no timely objection to
the agreement and accepted the additional $200.00 per month from
him; thus she should be estopped from denying its validity. It
is easily understood why plaintiff accepted the increased
payments. She was confused as to her position, unsure of what
her counsel might do next, and the payments appear to have been
her sole means of support. Any refusal to accept might have
resulted in a delay or cessation of support or increased delays
in determining the status of defendant's obligations. We have
already discussed the time delays plaintiff experienced in
obtaining an appointment with her counsel after she first read
the written agreement. These facts are insufficient to impute a
timeliness issue in accordance with Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472,
476 (Utah 1975). Neither do these facts give rise to estoppel.
2. Certainly a stipulation setting terms for payment of alimony
and child support would fall within the Statute of Frauds since
such an agreement would not be performed within one year from
the making. The putative stipulation here would run for many
years with changes to occur at stated intervals.
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We will not go around the Statute of Frauds and Rule 4.5(b) to
create a stipulation on the mere acceptance of $200,00 per month
by plaintiff.3 Whether she is entitled to retain the extra
payments or will be required to credit defendant shall be
determined by the trial court on remand.
In summary, we hold that the putative stipulation of June 5,
1984, fails to meet the requirements of a valid stipulation as
stated above. The order enforcing the agreement is reversed and
the case is remanded to the trial court for further action on
plaintiff's original petition for modification. Costs against
defendant.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

I CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
ORME, Judge: (dissenting)
I think what is said in the main opinion about the
requirements for a binding stipulation is correct. I agree the
requirements for a valid stipulation were not met in this case.
However, there are situations where a settlement agreement is
reached—where all parties have had a meeting of the minds as to
the basis for settlement of an action or proceeding—through a
device other than a stipulation. That agreement might be
memorialized by an exchange of letters, dictation to a shorthand
reporter, or even just a handshake. In my view, such agreements,
intended to be binding when made, are enforceable and should be
enforced. They should be enforced even though one party might
have a change of heart or otherwise balk at signing a formal
stipulation designed to implement the valid and binding agreement
previously made. Parties have no right to welch on a settlement
deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the
deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be garnered
on a stipulation.
3. The evidence shows this defendant to be earning a
substantial income. The additional $200.00 per month paid on
this putative stipulation represents no hardship and no material
change of circumstances on his part.
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The key in this case, then, is whether appellant assented to
the settlement agreement which was dictated to the reporter in
her presence. She concededly sat mute throughout the
proceeding. Her duly employed attorney, however, manifested
assent on her behalf. The pivotal issue is whether he had
authority to do so.
The facts are in conflict on this point. Appellant suggests
she was stupefied by her former attorney's betrayal and rendered
unable to speak or, apparently, even to storm out. On the other
hand, it is reasonable to infer, as those present did, that a
principal who says nothing when her agent speaks for her is in
accord with the sentiments expressed by the agent. This
inference is bolstered by evidence which is usually quite
reliable—the subsequent course of conduct of the parties.
Following the apparent agreement, respondent made payment at the
higher level contemplated by the putative settlement and for
several months appellant accepted those payments without
incident. No unfavorable inference would be available from her
merely cashing the checks, which were mostly for amounts clearly
due her. But her retention and use of the extra amount not due
her under the original decree is consistent only with an
understanding that a settlement had been reached—or, I suppose,
of dishonesty on her part. Laypersons fully understand that they
may spend money only if it is theirs. There being nothing to
suggest appellant was dishonest, the fact that she kept the extra
amount rather than returning it tends to show she thought it was
hers to keep; it could be hers to keep only if the decree were
modified, as per the settlement, to increase the monthly total
due for her support and that of the children. Thus, her
retention and use of the larger payments tendered subsequent to
the alleged settlement tends to show she had agreed to the terms
of the settlement.
The facts concerning whether appellant assented to the
settlement would support a conclusion either way. After hearing
the motion to enforce the settlement, which a commissioner
earlier heard and recommended be granted, the trial court made
findings of fact to the effect that appellant was bound by the
settlement. I concede, however, that those findings are not
entitled to the usual deference because the court did not receive
actual testimony. ££. Diversified Equities. Inc. v. American
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Savings & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).* The
court received affidavits and counsels1 representations about
what the testimony would show. Thus, the trial court's usual
advantage in terms of viewing the witnesses and their demeanor
does not obtain in this case. We are in as good a position to
review the affidavits and consider the proffer2 as was the
1. In Diversified Equities, the trial court received an
extensive recitation of facts to which the parties had
stipulated. 739 P.2d at 1134. The trial court then entered
M
findingsM of fact. We observed: "Generally/ a trial court's
findings of fact are accorded great deference. However, without
regard to the labels used, when those "findings- proceed from
stipulated facts . . . the "findings" are tantamount to
conclusions of law, with *he stipulation of facts being the
functional equivalent of the findings of fact." 739 P.2d at
1136. That conclusion is premised on two factors: First, a
disposition based on stipulated facts is "not one involving
resolution by the trial court of conflicting testimony."
Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
Second, since the facts are written or recited and do not turn
on witness credibility, an appellate court has "the same means
as the trial court had of reaching a correct conclusion of
law . . . ." Stiles v. Brown. 380 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Ala.
1980). Those same factors apply to the affidavits and proffer
which substituted for testimony in the instant case. Although
the conflict between the affidavits should have prompted an
evidentiary hearing, see Note 3, infra, we are in as good a
position as was the trial court to read the affidavits and the
proffer and draw logical conclusions therefrom.
2. Fortunately, one of the two attorneys requested that the
hearing be reported or the proffer would be unavailable to us.
Such a hearing should be reported as a matter of course. See
Brioos v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(••Although consistently making a record of all proceedings
imposes a greater burden on the trial court and court reporters,
it is impossible for an appellate court to review what may
ultimately prove to be important proceedings when no record of
them has been made.").
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trial court.3 After considering these items, I agree with the
commissioner and the trial judge that the facts more readily
support the conclusion that appellant initially agreed to the
settlement and then had a change of heart than the conclusion
that she never agreed but was rendered unable to say so and
simply regarded the extra amounts tendered as a coincidental gift
from her ex-husband.
I would affirm.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

3. In retrospect, an evidentiary hearing would probably have
been preferable. Had the testimony been consistent with the
affidavits and proffer and the same findings made, those findings
would clearly be entitled to the usual deference and the trial
court's disposition would clearly be entitled to affirmance.
However, neither side requested an evidentiary hearing and
appellant does not argue on appeal that she was entitled to one.
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